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PREFACE 
Task 3 of the Systeni and Ilecision Sciences Area, "Decision .4nalysis 
and Conflict Resolution". is devoted, in part. to the study of thc question: 
what criteria and methods can t ~ e  dcvelopcd for the equitable division of 
resources or other given quantities among conlpeting interests? 
This paper treats a specific problem that has wide application in public 
sector decision making, namely, the allocation of representation to  different 
parties, regions. or interest groups according to thcir sizc or to  some other 
measure. In the context of allocating scats to  parties this is hnown as the 
proportional rrpresrntation problem. 
The paper is dircctly concerned with normative political science. and 
as such, has policy relcvance t o  decision makers respor~sible for determining 
methods of representation. 
The objective of the paper is to analyze various proposed methods of 
allocation in the light of common-sensr properties, and to  make more precise 
what is meant by a "fair" or "equitable" solutiori. Experience has shown 
that if political debatc can bc raiscd from a bickering over particular num- 
bers to  au agreement on principles, a solution is more likely to  be forth- 
coming. 
In an earlirr paper by the authors, Crilrria for l'roportional Repres~n -  
lation, various reasor~able propcrtit:~ were irltroduced I'or proportional rcpre- 
sentation methods, and detailed mathematical arguments were used to show 
that various of thesc properties could be used t o  characterize particular 
methods. 111 this paper the implications of these results are discussed in depth. 
Moreover, a new property callecl uniformity is introduced which is shown to 
have iri~portant implications for charactcrizing classes of proportional repre- 
sentation methods. 
The methods and approaches developcd in this paper. and in other 
allied papers. should prove to  be a methodological step towards treating 
problems of fair division and conflict resolution found in more complcx 
situations than the one considered here. Thus. this work represents a step in 
an ongoing program. albeit a step which has imrnediatc relevance t o  a 
problem encountered in many countries. 
This paper directly addresses the political science community rather 
than the applied mathematics or systems sciences community. Technical 
detail is avoided in order to concentrate on normative political issues. 

SUMMARY 
The following problem arises in many political contexts. A certain 
number of political "parties" are to  split a given number of seats in a legisla- 
ture according to  the numbers of votes they obtained in an election. What 
principles should determine how these seats are to be allocated? 
A basic principle dictated by both common sense and historical 
precedent is "house monotonicity": if the number of seats to  be allocated 
goes up, then, all other faktors being equal. no party's allocation should go 
down. Another basic prinicple is "uniformity": if two parties of given sizes 
divide a certain number of seats, then they should always divide this number 
in the same way. These properties characterize an important class of methods 
called the Huntington methods. A further property relevant to  proportional 
representation is the tendency of some methods to encourage parties to  
merge by awarding more seats to  the merged party than they would receive 
separately. (Similarly, some methods encourage schisms by penalizing larger 
parties.) This property singles out one of the Huntington methods--the 
so-called Jefferson, or d'Hondt method--as particularly desirable. But a third 
property, that of "satisfying quota" is violated by the Jefferson method. 
This recommends for consideration a new method, called the Quota method. 
The conclusion is that agreement on the desired principles of propor- 
tional representation provides a basis for the rational selection of a method 
to  affect allocations. Thus the axiomatic approach of mathematics provides 
a normative basis for the design of political systems. 

S t a b i l i t y ,  C o a l i t i o n s ,  and Schisms i n  
P r o p o r t i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  Systems 
INTRODUCTION 
There  e x i s t  w h o l e s a l e  numbers o f  p o s s i b l e  e l e c t i o n  p roce-  
d u r e s .  A b a s i c  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e s e  has  been made i n t o  
" p l u r a l i t y  sys tems"  and " p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  (PR) s y s t e m s " .  
I n  a  p l u r a l i t y  s y s t e m  an  e l e c t o r  u s u a l l y  c a s t s  one v o t e  
f o r  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  o r  t h e  ( p a r t y )  l i s t  of  c a n d i d a t e s  o f  h i s  o r  
h e r  c h o i c e  i n  some e l e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t ,  and t h e  c a n d i d a t e  o r  t h e  
l i s t  r e c e i v i n g  a  m a j o r i t y  o r  a  p l u r a l i t y  i s  e l e c t e d .  Such 
sys tems  a r e  based  on a  n o t i o n  o f  g e o g r a p h i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  
Mid-n ine teen th  c e n t u r y  Europe saw an i n c r e a s i n g  d i s s a t i s f a c -  
t i o n  w i t h  p l u r a l i t y  sys tems  a s  u n f a i r  t o  m i n o r i t i e s ,  f o r  s m a l l  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  were e f f e c t i v e l y  b a r r e d  from hav ing  any re- 
p r e s e n t a t i o n  whenever t h e i r  a d h e r e n t s  w e r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  th rough-  
o u t  many single-member e l e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t s .  
T h i s  l e d  t o  t h e  i d e a  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  which,  
i n  i t s  p u r e  form,  h a s  e l e c t o r s  c a s t  one v o t e  f o r  a  p a r t y  o r  a  
p a r t y  l i s t  i n  a  multimember d i s t r i c t  and t h e n ,  by some r u l e ,  
m e t e s  numbers o f  s e a t s  " p r o p o r t i o n a l l y "  among t h e  p a r t i e s  ac -  
c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v o t e  t o t a l s .  Of c o u r s e ,  v a r i a n t s  
o f  b o t h  t y p e s  o f  sys tem e x i s t ,  a s  d o  complex m i x t u r e s .  
T h i s  p a p e r  f o c u s e s  on t h e  p u r e  form of  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  problem: v o t e r s  c a s t  a  s i n g l e  v o t e  f o r  a  p a r t y  
i n  a  multimember d i s t r i c t  and t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  
j u s t  number o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  due  e a c h  p a r t y .  Exac t  p r o p o r t i o n -  
a l i t y  c a n n o t ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  be  a c h i e v e d  s i n c e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  must 
be i n t e g r a l .  Some " rounding"  must t a k e  p l a c e .  Appearances  t o  
t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  an o p e r a t i o n a l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e x a c t l y  how t o  e f f e c t  
t h i s  r o u n d i n g  i s  n o t  e a s i l y  fo r thcoming  and h i s t o r y  i s  r i c h  w i t h  
c o n t r o v e r s i e s  o v e r  p roposed  s o l u t i o n s  and methods. 
W e  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  o n l y  v a l i d  approach  t o  t h e  comparison 
of methods,  and hence t o  t h e  u l t i m a t e  c h o i c e  of a  method, i s  
t h r o u g h  c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e i r  p r o p e r t i e s .  Cons ider  an 
a r b i t r a r y  method of  a l l o c a t i o n  M. Does M have t h e  p r o p e r t y  
- - 
of  a lways  a s s u r i n g  a  p a r t y  a t  l e a s t  i t s  e x a c t  p r o p o r t i o n a l  num- 
b e r  o f  s e a t s  rounded down, o r  a t  most t h a t  number o f  s e a t s  
rounded up? Suppose t h a t ,  w i t h  v o t e  t o t a l s  unchanged, t h e  num- 
b e r  o f  s e a t s  i n  a  p a r l i a m e n t  i s  i n c r e a s e d :  d o e s  t h e  method M 
- 
a lways  a s s u r e  e a c h  p a r t y  a t  l e a s t  a s  much r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a s  was 
a l l o c a t e d  t o  it b e f o r e ?  Suppose t h a t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  s t a n d i n g  
a l o n e ,  two p a r t i e s  form a  c o a l i t i o n  which o b t a i n s  t h e  same v o t e  
t o t a l  a s  t h e  sum of  t h e  v o t e s  t h a t  would have  been r e c e i v e d  by 
t h e  p a r t i e s  s e p a r a t e l y :  does  t h e  method M g i v e  a t  l e a s t  a s  
- 
many s e a t s  t o  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  a s  t h e  sum o f  t h e  s e a t s  M would 
- 
have a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  p a r t i e s  s e p a r a t e l y ?  P o s t u l a t e  an e l e c t i o n  
i n  which some s u b s e t  o f  p a r t i e s ,  e a c h  s t a n d i n g  a l o n e ,  i s  a l l o -  
c a t e d  c e r t a i n  numbers o f  s e a t s  by a  method M and t h a t  t h e y  j o i n t -  
- 
l y  h o l d  h  s e a t s :  i f  M were used t o  a l l o c a t e  t h o s e  h  s e a t s  among 
- 
o n l y  t h e s e  p a r t i e s  w i t h  t h e  g i v e n  v o t e  t o t a l s ,  would M a r r i v e  a t  
- 
t h e  same a l l o c a t i o n ?  
I t  is  p e r h a p s  s u r p r i s i n g  -- b u t  it i s  a  f a c t - - t h a t  no  method 
e n j o y s  many of  t h e  combina t ions  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  s u g g e s t e d  by 
t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  t h a t  some methods a r e  t h e  o n l y  o n e s  which e n j o y  
c e r t a i n  c o m b i n a t i o n s ,  and t h a t  some o t h e r  combina t ions  d e f i n e  
p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s e s  o f  methods. Below, we d e s c r i b e  t h e  fundamen- 
t a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  methods i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  methods 
o f  a l l o c a t i o n  which have  been advanced o v e r  t h e  y e a r s  s i n c e  t h e  
problem o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  f i r s t  a r o s e .  W e  p o i n t  t o  
some i m p o s s i b l e  c o m b i n a t i o n s ,  and c h a r a c t e r i z e  two methods which 
seem p a r t i c u l a r l y  a p t  f o r  PR s y s t e m s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we i n t r o -  
duce  t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  methods b e i n g  s t a b l e ,  e n c o u r a g i n g  c o a l i t i o n s ,  
and e n c o u r a g i n g  sch i sms .  But t h e  c h o i c e  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  p r o p e r -  
t i e s  depends upon t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s i t u a t i o n ,  n a t i o n ,  and h e r i t a g e .  
Thus t h e  m o r a l  o f  t h e  p a p e r  i s :  p o l i t i c i a n s  s h o u l d  n o t  choose  
n u m e r i c a l  s o l u t i o n s ,  o r  even  n u m e r i c a l  methods. R a t h e r ,  t h e y  
s h o u l d  a r g u e  t h e  merits of  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  methods,  and l e t  t h e i r  
c o n c l u s i o n s  i n  p r i n c i p l e  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  methods and t h u s  t h e  
numbers. Thus, a x i o m a t i z a t i o n  f i n d s  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  r o l e .  
BACKGROUND 
L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  s p a r t i e s ,  and r e p r e s e n t  t h e  v o t e  t o t a l  o f  
e a c h  p a r t y  i by p i ,  12 i 2 s. h , a  n o n n e g a t i v e  i n t e g e r ,  w i l l  
b e  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  s e a t s  t o  be a l l o c a t e d  ( c a l l e d  t h e  house 
s i z e ) .  W e  c o n s i d e r  o n l y  t h o s e  p a r t i e s  which r e c e i v e  v o t e s ,  s o  
t h a t  pi > 0. For a  g i v e n  house s i z e  h ,  t h e  problem i s  t o  f i n d  an 
a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h:  namely, s n o n n e g a t i v e  i n t e g e r s  a l , a  2 , . . . , a s  
whose sum is  h. A s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
problem is  a  f u n c t i o n  f  which g i v e s ,  f o r  a l l  p o s s i b l e  v o t e  
- 
t o t a l s  p  = (p  11p2 ,.. . , p s )  and house s i z e  h ,  an a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  
- 
h :  a i  = f i  ( t j ,hl  2 0 ,  C ai = h .  A method, M, i s  t h e  f a m i l y  o f  
1 - 
a l l  s o l u t i o n s  produced by a  s p e c i f i c  c o m p u t a t i o n a l  r u l e .  ( T h i s  
a l l o w s  f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t i e s . )  
I n  f a c t  a  s i m i l a r  problem a r i s e s  under  p l u r a l i t y  s y s t e m s ,  
b u t  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  g u i s e .  F o r ,  u s u a l l y ,  a  c o u n t r y  i s  d i v i d e d  
i n t o  s t a t e s  o r  p r o v i n c e s  and e a c h  single-member e l e c t i o n  d i s -  
t r i c t  i s  whol ly  c o n t a i n e d  i n  one s u c h  s u b d i v i s i o n .  How many 
e l e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t s  o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  s h o u l d  one g e o g r a p h i c a l  
r e g i o n  be a l l o c a t e d ?  T h i s  problem i s  known a s  t h e  a p p o r t i o n -  
ment problem. (Of c o u r s e ,  g e o g r a p h i c a l  appor t ionment  c a n  a r i s e  
i n  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  sys tems  t o o . )  I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  
numbers p l ,pZ , . . . , ps  a r e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  ( o r  t h e  
number o f  v o t e r s )  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  s t a t e s ,  and ai  i s  t h e  number 
o f  s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  s t a t e  i. The appor t ionment  problem h a s  a  
long  and c o l o r f u l  h i s t o r y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
[ 1 , 7 , 2 1 1 .  
For  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  t h r e e  p r i n c i p a l  methods 
s e e m  t o  have been c o n s i d e r e d :  Sa in te -Lagf ie ' s  [ 2 0 ] ,  d 1 H o n d t ' s  
[12,13], and Hamilton's [23], the latter usually known as "la 
rgpartition au plus fort reste" [lo]. In the apportionment lit- 
erature Sainte-Lague's and dtHondt's methods have found their 
places under other names (see [14]), in a class of five "modern" 
methods [8,13] which, from about 1920 through 1974, were the ones 
collectively considered for apportioning the United States House 
of Representatives. 
The five modern methods were first grouped by E.V. 
Huntington [15] in 1921 via an approach to allocation based on 
pairwise comparisons of "inequality in representation". Given 
Vote totals p = (p , p,) and an allocation a = (al,. . . , as) 
- 
for h, consider the numbers p./a. and ai/pi. These represent 
1 1  
the number of votes per representative of party i and the number 
of representatives per vote of party i, respectively. If 
pi/ai > pj/aj, or ai/pi < aj/pj, or a > a. (pj/pi). or . . . , j 
(pi/ai) (aj/p.) > 1, then party j is b e t t e r  o f f  than party i. 
I 
Given a particular measure of inequality between a pair of 
parties such as (pi/a - pj/aj 1 or la./p. - a./p. it is natural i 1 . 1  I 1  
to ask whether the amount of inequality can be reduced by a trans 
fer of one seat from the better-off party to the less-well-off 
party. For a given measure an allocation is said to be i n  e q u i -  
l i b r i u m  if no transfer of a representative from a "better off" 
party to a "worse off" party reduces the amount of inequality 
between them. Of course, certain conceivable measures may not 
(and do not) admit equilibrium solutions for all vote-total dis- 
tributions, but Huntington showed [14,15] that five measures do. 
All of Huntington's methods are examples of the following 
type, called d i v i s o r  m e t h o d s .  Let d(a) be some monotone in- 
creasing function of the nonnegative integers a where d(0) 2 0. 
The d i v i s o r  method M based  on d(a) is defined to be the set of 
- 
all solutions obtained in the following manner for successive 
house sizes h. For h = 0, the allocation must be zero for every 
party. Given that an allocation (al,...,as) has been found for 
a house size h, an allocation for house size h +  1 is found by 
giving one more seat to a party k for which pk/d(ak) is a maximum. 
I f  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  s t a t e s  t h a t  a r e  t i e d  f o r  maximum, 
t h e n  s e v e r a l  a l l o c a t i o n s  may r e s u l t  u n l e s s  some t i e - b r e a k i n g  
r u l e  i s  employed. 
The numbers p i / d ( a i )  may be  t h o u g h t  o f  a s  measur ing  t h e  
" p r i o r i t y "  o f  a  p a r t y  w i t h  a i  s e a t s  t o  r e c e i v e  one  more s e a t .  Thus ,  
i f  one  more s e a t  i s  t o  be  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  t h e n  p a r t y  i w i l l  " d e s e r v e "  
i t  more t h a n  p a r t y  j  i f  pi/d ( a i )  > p  . / d  ( a j )  . I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  3 
d ( a i )  may be t h o u g h t  o f  a s  some s o r t  o f  " w e i g h t i n g "  of t h e  number 
of  s e a t s  t h a t  p a r t y  i a l r e a d y  h a s .  
One o f  t h e  most  commonly used methods f o r  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  ( e . g . ,  i n  A r g e n t i n a ,  Belgium, B r a z i l ,  F i n l a n d ,  
I s r a e l ,  L i e c h t e n s t e i n ,  and t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  [ 1 6 ] )  i s  t h a t  of  
d r H o n d t ,  a  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  B e l g i a n  l awyer  and p r o p o r t i o n a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a d v o c a t e .  T h i s  method, which was a c t u a l l y  f i r s t  
p roposed  by Thomas J e f f e r s o n  [ l l ]  i n  1972 ,  h a s  t h e r e f o r e  been 
c a l l e d  t h e  Jefferson method J [ 7 ] .  I n  f a c t  t h e  same method i s  
known i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  v a r i o u s l y  a s  t h e  method o f  " h i g h e s t  
a v e r a g e "  o r  " Z a  r6partition ?I Za plus forte moyenne" and i s  
d e s c r i b e d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  though  i n  f a c t  i t  l e a d s  t o  t h e  same r e s u l t  
( s e e  S e c t i o n  4 below) . 
The J e f f e r s o n  method i s  one o f  t h e  f i v e  d i v i s o r  methods 
s t u d i e d  by H u n t i n g t o n ,  and  it u s e s  t h e  d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n  d ( a )  = 
a  + 1. The r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  c r i t e r i o n  i s  a s  
f o l l o w s .  I f  p a r t y  i h a s  a i  s e a t s  t h e n  p i / a i - - t h e  number o f  
v o t e s  p e r  s e a t - -  i s  a  measure  o f  how w e l l - r e p r e s e n t e d  t h a t  p a r t y  
c u r r e n t l y  i s .  I f  one more s e a t  were  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  
t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method p r o c e e d s  by g i v i n g  t h e  e x t r a  s e a t  t o  a  
p a r t y  t h a t  would be t h e  w o r s t - o f f  were  every p a r t y  t o  g e t  one more 
s e a t ,  i . e . ,  by g i v i n g  t h e  e x t r a  s e a t  t o  a  p a r t y  k  w i t h  t h e  l a r g e s t  
pk/ 
Another  p l a u s i b l e  c r i t e r i o n ,  one migh t  a r g u e ,  would be  t o  
a lways  g i v e  t h e  " a d d i t i o n a l "  s e a t  t o  t h e  p a r t y  t h a t  i s  currently 
t h e  w o r s t  o f f ,  i - e . ,  t o  t h e  p a r t y  f o r  which pk/ak is a  maximum. 
This  method is known i n  t h e  apport ionment l i t e r a t u r e  a s  t h e  
"method of s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s "  (S-D), and i s  a l s o  one of Hunt ington ' s  
f i v e .  These f i v e  methods, and t h e i r  cor responding  d i v i s o r  c r i -  
t e r i a ,  a r e  shown i n  Table 1. 
Table 1. Hun t ing ton ' s  f i v e  methods. 
Method Div i so r  C r i t e r i o n  
d  ( a )  
Smal les t  D iv i so r s  (SD) a  
- 
Harmonic Mean ( H M )  2a (a+1) / ( 2 a + l )  
- 




o r  Major F r a c t i o n s  
o r  Sainte-Lagfie Formula ( a + + )  
J e f f e r s o n  (J)  
& 
o r  G r e a t e s t  D iv i so r s  a+ 1 
o r  d '  Hondt 
o r  p l u s  f o r t e  moyenne 
That  t h e s e  a r e  a c t u a l l y  a l l  d i f f e r e n t  methods is  seen  from 
t h e  example i n  Table 2 ,  where t h e  f i v e  methods a l l o c a t e  36 s e a t s  
among s i x  p a r t i e s  i n  f i v e  d i f f e r e n t  ways. 
Table 2 .  
Party Votes Wceived 





F  3,292 
Exact 
Proportionality 
Another  commonly used  r u l e ,  e . g . ,  i n  Denmark and Norway 
[ 1 6 ] ,  is  t h a t  known a s  Sa in te -Lagt ie ' s  method [ I51  ( f o u r t h  i n  
t h e  l i s t  o f  H u n t i n g t o n ' s  m e t h o d s ) .  T h i s  i s  a l s o  known i n  t h e  
a p p o r t i o n m e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  a s  " t h e  method of  major  f r a c t i o n s " ,  
b u t  was i n  f a c t  f i r s t  s u g g e s t e d  i n  embryonic form by D a n i e l  
Webster  [24]  i n  1832 and h a s  t h e r e f o r e  been c a l l e d  t h e  W e b s t e r  
me thod  W [ 7 ] .  A p a r t i c u l a r  v a r i a n t  o f  W i s  t h e  m o d i f i e d  
- - 
"method o f  odd numbers" used i n  Sweden. I t  i s  d e f i n e d  by: 
d ( 0 )  = 7/10 ( i n s t e a d  o f  d ( 0 )  = 4 ) ,  and o t h e r w i s e  t h e  d i v i s o r s  
a r e  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  W ,  d ( a )  = a  + 4 .  The t h i r d  o f  
- 
H u n t i n g t o n ' s  methods,  Equal  P r o p o r t i o n s  ( E P ) ,  - was t h e  o n e  
f a v o r e d  by Hunt ing ton ,  and i s  t h e  method c u r r e n t l y  used  t o  
a p p o r t i o n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  
I t  i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  h i s t o r i c a l  n o t e  t h a t  Sainte-Lagtie [20]  
came upon t h e  Webster  method q u i t e  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  v i a  t h e  i d e a  
o f  min imiz ing  a  t o t a l  measure o f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  o f  an a l l o c a t i o n .  
He proposed  t h a t  an a l l o c a t i o n  s h o u l d  minimize 
s i n c e  i n  a  p e r f e c t  a l l o c a t i o n  h/p = ai/pi f o r  a l l  i. The Webster 
method p r o v i d e s  s o l u t i o n s  which d o  t h i s .  I n  t h e  same p a p e r  
Sa in te -Lagbe  s u g g e s t s  i n  words ( though  n o t  i n  symbols)  t h a t  one 
c o u l d  b e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  minimizing 
b u t  t h a t  "one i s  l e d  t o  a  more complex r u l e " .  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  
g i v e s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  method of  Equa l  P r o p o r t i o n s .  
There  is  a n o t h e r  method t h a t  i s  o f t e n  p roposed  f o r  p ropor -  
t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  and which i s ,  seemingly ,  t h e  most n a t u r a l  
one.  Al though known by s e v e r a l  names, i n c l u d i n g  " L a  ~ 6 ~ a r t i t i o v i  
au p l u s  f o r t  r e s t p "  and " V i n t o n ' s  method of  1850" ,  it was ap- 
p a r e n t l y  f i r s t  p roposed  by Alexander  Hamil ton [ 2 3 ]  i n  1 7 9 2  and 
h a s  t h e r e f o r e  been c a l l e d  t h e  H a m i l t o n  method H [ 7 1 .  
Def ine  t h e  e x a c t  q u o t a  of  p a r t y  j  t o  be q  = q j  ( e , h )  = j 
pjh / l iP i ;  it i s  t h e  e x a c t l y  p r o p o r t i o n a l  number o f  s e a t s  de- 
s e r v e d  by p a r t y  j  and t h e  number t h a t  one  would wish t o  a l l o c a t e  
t o  j  w e r e  it i n t e g r a l .  L e t  L q . J  d e n o t e  t h e  l a r g e s t  i n t e g e r  l e s s  
I  
t h a n  o r  e q u a l  t o  q . .  The H a m i l t o n  method is  d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  f o l -  
I  
lowing  way: f i r s t ,  g i v e  t o  e a c h  p a r t y  j  4.J s e a t s ;  t h e n  o r d e r  
I 
t h e  p a r t i e s  by t h e i r  f r a c t i o n a l  r e m a i n d e r s  d  = q .  - L q . J  2 0  j  I I - 
i n  a  p r i o r i t y  l i s t  d  F . . . >  - d .  . Second,  g i v e  one a d d i t i o n a l  
1, - - I s  
s e a t  t o  e a c h  o f  t h e  f i r s t  h  - l L q j J  p a r t i e s  on t h e  l i s t .  I f  
t h e r e  a r e  t i e s  t h e n  t h e r e  e x i s t  d i s t i n c t  a r rangements  o f  t h e  
p r i o r i t y  l i s t  a n d ,  hence ,  p o s s i b l y  s e v e r a l  s o l u t i o n s .  
The r a t i o n a l e  o f  t h e  Hamil ton method i s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g .  
Every p a r t y  j  c e r t a i n l y  d e s e r v e s  a  number o f  s e a t s  a t  l e a s t  
e q u a l  t o  i t s  l ower  q u o t a  L q . J  , hence we b e g i n  by g i v i n g  e a c h  
I 
p a r t y  a t  l e a s t  t h i s  many s e a t s .  Any method such  t h a t  
f o r  a l l  a l l o c a t i o n s  a  f o r  h  is  s a i d  t o  s a t i s f y  Zower q u o t a .  
- 
By t h e  same t o k e n ,  no p a r t y  j d e s e r v e s  t o  r e c e i v e  more t h a n  
r q . 1  s e a t s  (where T q . 1  i s  t h e  n e x t  i n t e g e r  l a r g e r  t h a n  q .  o r  
3 I  1 
i f  q .  i t s e l f  i s  i n t e g e r ,  T q . 1  = q . ) .  T q . 1  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  u p p e r  
I  I  3 I  
q u o t a  o f  s t a t e  j ,  and a  method s a t i s f i e s  u p p e r  q u o t a  i f  f o r  a l l  
a l l o c a t i o n s  a  f o r  h ,  
-. 
A method M s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a  i f  it s a t i s f i e s  b o t h  lower  and 
- 
upper  q u o t a  f o r  a l l  p a r t i e s  j and a l l o c a t i o n s  a .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
- 
t h e  Hamil ton method s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a .  
The Hamil ton method,  o r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  i t ,  i s  c u r r e n t l y  
u s e d  f o r  PR i n  t h e  p a r l i a m e n t s  o f  C o s t a  R i c a  and I t a l y  [ 1 6 ] ,  
and was f o r m e r l y  used  i n  I s r a e l .  Under t h e  name of  t h e  Vinton 
msthod of  1850 it was a l s o  u s e d  t o  a p p o r t i o n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
House of  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from 1850 t o  1900. 
I n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h e  Hamil ton method 
a  s t a r t l i n g  d i s c o v e r y  was made: i n  1881,  it would have g i v e n  
Alabama 8 s e a t s  i n  a  house  of  299 b u t  o n l y  7  s e a t s  i n  a  house  
of 300. " T h i s  a t r o c i t y  which [ m a t h e m a t i c i a n s ]  have e l e c t e d  
t o  c a l l  a  ' p a r a d o x '  ... t h i s  f r e a k  p r e s e n t s  a  m a t h e m a t i c a l  i m -  
p o s s i b i l i t y "  ( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  John  C .  B e l l  o f  C o l o r a d o ,  8  J a n u a r y  
1901 ,  [ 9 ,  pp.  724-7251) i s  a  t y p i c a l ,  a l b e i t  somewhat h y s t e r i c a l ,  
p o l i t i c i a n ' s  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  p r o p e r t y .  The phenomenon, known a s  
t h e  AZabama paradox, i s  n o t  an i s o l a t e d  q u i r k  o f  t h e  Hamil ton 
method, b u t  o c c u r s  f r e q u e n t l y .  C o n s i d e r  t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  of  t h e  
s i x  p a r t i e s  i n  T a b l e  3: p a r t i e s  D and E a r e  g i v e n  a  t o t a l  o f  10 
s e a t s  when 37 a r e  t o  be a l l o c a t e d ,  b u t  o n l y  8  when 38 a r e  t o  be  
a l l o c a t e d .  The p o i n t  i s  n o t  t h a t  one would n e c e s s a r i l y  be  i n  a  
s i t u a t i o n  where t h e  number o f  s e a t s  t o  be  a l l o c a t e d  i n c r e a s e s  by 
1 - -a l though  h i s t o r y  i s  r e p l e t e  w i t h  h o u s e s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
which i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  numbers--but r a t h e r  t h a t  any method e x h i b i t -  
i n g  s u c h  b e h a v i o r  r u n s  t o t a l l y  c o n t r a r y  t o  any n o t i o n  o f  what  a  
f a i r  and r e a s o n a b l e  method s h o u l d  do.  One need o n l y  r e f e r  t o  t h e  
u n i v e r s a l  r e a c t i o n  of  shock among p o l i t i c i a n s  when t h e  e v e n t  
o c c u r r e d  t o  gauge t h e  poZiticaZ u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  I!amilton 
method. I t s  u s e  i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  h a s  been d e f i n i t e l y  aban- 
doned.  Were a  p o l i t i c a l  party t o  l o s e  a  s e a t  o n l y  b e c a u s e  t h e  
t o t a l  number o f  s e a t s  t o  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  had been  i n c r e a s e d ,  a  
s i m i l a r  hue  and c r y  would c e r t a i n l y  r e s u l t .  
T a b l e  3 .  
B C D E 
Vote Total 27,744 25,178 19,947 14,614 9,225 
Exact quota 39 9.819 7.779 5.699 3.598 1.284 





Exac tquo ta35  1 9 . 7 1 1  8.812 6.982 5.115 3.229 1.152 
/ Exact quota 37 
I H al locat ion 37 
Exact quota 38 
1 H allocation 38 
Thus,  an e s s e n t i a l  p r o p e r t y  f o r  any  f a i r  and r e a s o n a b l e  P R  
method hJ i s  t h a t  it b e  house monotone, t h a t  i s ,  f o r  any M-solu- 
t i o n  f ,  no p a r t y  must r e c e i v e  fewer  s e a t s  i f  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  
t o  b e  a l l o c a t e d  i n c r e a s e s :  
H allocation 35 
Exact quota 36 
H al locat ion 36 
f  ( p , h + l )  2 f  ( p , h )  f o r  a l l  p  and h  - 
- - - - 
10 9 7 5 3 1 
9.998 9.064 7.181 5.261 3.321 1.185 
10 9 7 5 4 1 
10.265 9.316 7.380 5.407 3.413 1.218 
10 9 7 6 4 1 
10.543 9.568 7.580 5.533 3.506 1.251 
11 10 8 5 3 1 
I t  was t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  house  monotone methods t h a t  m o t i v a t e d  
H u n t i n g t o n ,  b e g i n n i n g  i n  t h e  e a r l y  p a r t  o f  t h i s  c e n t u r y ,  t o  f o r -  
m u l a t e  t h e  c l a s s  o f  f i v e  methods e x h i b i t e d  i n  T a b l e  1. A l l  o f  






P a r t i e s  i n  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  s y s t e m s  a r e  dynamic. 
They may g r o u p  t o g e t h e r  f o r  e l e c t o r a l  p u r p o s e s ,  b u t  t h e y  may a l s o  
s p l i n t e r .  The p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  method used  f o r  a l l o c a t i n g  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  p a r t i e s  may w e l l  have  consequences  f o r  t h i s  
t e n d e n c y  t o  c o a l e s c e  o r  t o  s p l i n t e r - -  i n  s h o r t ,  f o r  t h e i r  s t a -  
b i l i t y  [ 1 9 ] .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  it i s  p e r t i n e n t  t o  a s k :  how d o e s  
t h e  number o f  s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  by a  method M t o  t h e  j o i n t  v o t e  
- 
t o t a l  o f  two p a r t i e s  c o a l e s c e d  i n t o  one  compare w i t h  t h e  s e a t s  
a l l o c a t e d  by M t o  t h e  two p a r t i e s  s e p a r a t e l y ?  
- 
T h i s  p r o p e r t y  is i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  any c o a l i t i o n  o r  s c h i s m  
f o r m a t i o n  which migh t  o c c u r  i n  a  p a r l i a m e n t  a f t e r  an e l e c t i o n .  
R a t h e r ,  it forms a n  u n d e r l y i n g  s t r u c t u r a l  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  l a r g e r  
o r  s m a l l e r  p a r t i e s  t o  form b e f o r e  e l e c t i o n s .  T h i s  t y p e  o f  i n -  
c e n t i v e  i s  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and c a n n o t  be  
e x p e c t e d  t o  be  d i r e c t l y  o b s e r v a b l e  o r  m e a s u r a b l e  i n  any one  
e l e c t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  it c o n s t i t u t e s  a  n o r m a t i v e  b a s i s  f o r  
t h e  d e s i g n  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  s y s t e m s .  
C o n s i d e r  a  method M and a  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  v o t e  t o t a l s  p  i n  
- - 
which some p a r t y  h a s  p* v o t e s  and i s  a l l o c a t e d  a *  s e a t s ,  and 
a n o t h e r  p a r t y  h a s  p v o t e s  and i s  a l l o c a t e d  a s e a t s .  Now suppose  
t h a t  t h e  two p a r t i e s  merge i n t o  one  p a r t y  w i t h  a  combined v o t e  
t o t a l  p + p*. The method M i s  s a i d  t o  be  s t a b l e  i f  t h e r e  i s  an 
- 
M - a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s e a t s  t h a t  g i v e s  t h e  merged p a r t y  no more t h a n  
- 
a *  + a + 1 s e a t s  and no l e s s  t h a n  a *  + a - 1 s e a t s .  The mean- 
i n g  o f  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n s  t o  p a r t i e s  sepa-  
r a t e l y  s h o u l d  n o t  be  t o o  d i f f e r e n t  f rom wha t  t h e  p a r t i e s  would 
r e c e i v e  by merger ,  f o r  i f  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  t h e n  t h e  method 
i t s e l f  may t e n d  t o  encourage  p a r t y  mergers  o r  s c h i s m s ,  i .e . ,  
i n s t a b i l i t y .  
The f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t  may t h e n  b e  shown [31.  
(1) Any d i v i s o r  method w i t h  d i v i s o r  c r i t e r i o n  d ( a ) s a t i s f y i n g  
i s  s t a b l e .  
I t  may b e  checked t h a t  t h e  f i v e  methods o f  T a b l e  1 s a t i s f y  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n ,  hence a l l  o f  them a r e  s t a b l e .  
To s e e  how s t a b i l i t y  works ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  o f  
t h e  s i x  p a r t i e s  i n  Tab le  2 ,  and suppose  t h a t  p a r t i e s  D and E 
merge t o  form o n e  p a r t y .  The J e f f e r s o n  method t h e n  a c c o r d s  t h e  
merged p a r t y  one more s e a t  t h a n  t h e  sum of  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  a l l o -  
c a t i o n s .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  seemingly s i m i l a r  
d i v i s o r  method based  on d ( a )  = a  - 1. T h i s  does  n o t  s a t i s f y  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n  ( I ) ,  and t h e  example o f  T a b l e  3 shows it i s  un- 
s t a b l e :  t h e  method a l l o c a t e s  t o  t h e  merged p a r t y  a  t o t a l  o f  2 
s e a t s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  sum o f  t h e i r  s e p a r a t e  a l l o c a t i o n s  (see 
T a b l e  4 )  . 
T h e r e  a r e  n o n d i v i s o r  methods which a r e  s t a b l e ;  f o r  example 
it i s  proven i n  t h e  appendix  t h a t  
( 2 )  The Hami l ton  method i s  s t a b l e .  
T a b l e  4 .  2 compared w i t h  an u n s t a b l e  method. 
before  J - so lu t ion  J - so lu t ion  (a-1) - so l .  (a-1) - s o l .  
Par ty  merger merger before  before a f t e r  
METHODS ENCOURAGING COALITIONS AND METHODS ENCOURAGING 
SCHISMS 
For  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  it i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  a s k  
n o t  o n l y  whe the r  a  method i s  s t a b l e ,  b u t  a l s o  whe the r  i t  t e n d s  
t o  e n c o u r a g e  p a r t i e s  t o  merge o r  t o  s p l i n t e r .  I n  o t h e r  words ,  
t h e  way i n  which a  method a l l o c a t e s  s e a t s  may c r e a t e  a  s u b t l e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  l a r g e r  o r  s m a l l e r  p a r t i e s  t o  e v o l v e ,  
depend ing  on whe the r  t h e  merger  o f  p a r t i e s  t e n d s  t o  r e s u l t  i n  a  
n e t  g a i n  o r  a  n e t  l o s s  o f  s e a t s .  For  p o Z i t i c a Z  s t a b i l i t y  it 
would u s u a l l y  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  d e s i r a b l e  t o  have  methods  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  
t h a t  e n c o u r a g e  p a r t i e s  t o  merge,  by a s s u r i n g  t h a t  t h i s  would 
n e v e r  r e s u l t  i n  a  n e t  l o s s  o f  s e a t s ,  and m i g h t  i n  f a c t  r e s u l t  
i n  a n  i n c r e a s e .  
To make t h e s e  i d e a s  p r e c i s e ,  c o n s i d e r  any  method M and  any 
- 
s i t u a t i o n  p  i n  which some p a r t y  h a s  6 v o t e s  and  i s  a l l o c a t e d  a 
- 
s e a t s  by M and some o t h e r  p a r t y  h a s  p* v o t e s  and i s  a l l o c a t e d  
- 
a *  s e a t  by M .  Suppose t h a t  t h e  s t a r -  and b a r - p a r t i e s  merge t o  
- 
c r e a t e  a  p a r t y  wit.h a  t o t a l  o f  p* + p v o t e s .  We s a y  t h a t  M en-  
- 
courwges c o a Z i t i o n s  i f  i n  any s u c h  s i t u a t i o n  t h e r e  is  an M -  
- 
a l l o c a t i o n  g i v i n g  a t  l e a s t  a *  + a s e a t s  t o  t h e  c o a l e s c e d  p a r t y .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  a n  M - a l l o c a t i o n  g i v i n g  a t  most a*+: 
s e a t s  t o  t h e  c o a l e s c e d  p a r t y  t h e n  M_ i s  s a i d  t o  . / r l i 2 c ' : i i A U L . ' . '  :::?'?. 
C o n s i d e r ,  f o r  example ,  t h e  d i v i s o r  method w i t h  d i v i s o r  
c r i t e r i o n  d ( a )  = a  + 6 a p p l i e d  f o r  36 s e a t s  t o  t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  
g i v e n  i n  T a b l e  2 ,  and compare t h e  r e s u l t  w i t h  t h a t  o f  t h e  
J e f f e r s o n  method ( s e e  T a b l e  5 ) .  I f  p a r t i e s  B and C  merge,  t h e n  
t h e y  r e c e i v e  f o u r  more s e a t s  under  t h e  ( a  + 6 )  -method, and one 
more u n d e r  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method. Thus under  b o t h  methods t h e r e  
i s  an  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  p a r t i e s  t o  merge.  However, t h e  ( a  + 6)-method 
is u n s t a b l e .  ? ? o r e o v e r ,  it  w i l l  be  n o t i c e d  t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h e  ( a  + 6 ) -  
method works  even  more s t r o n g l y  t h a n  2 t o  e n c o u r a g e  c o a l i t i o n s  
it d o e s  s o  a t  t h e  c o s t  o f  s e r i o u s l y  p e n a l i z i n q  t h e  s r r a l l e r  p a r t i e s .  
T a b l e  5 .  Example o f  e n c o u r a a i n g  c o a l i t i o n s .  
-- 
Vote Vote 
t o t a l s  t o t a l s  Exact Exact 
--1 
(a+6)-  (a+6)-  
before  a f t e r  quotas quotas J - so l .  J-sol .  s o lu t i on  so lu t i on  
Par ty  merger merger before  a f t e r  before  a f t e r  before a f t e r  
Thus,  none o f  t h e  t h r e e  s m a l l e s t  p a r t i e s  g e t s  even  i t s  lower  
q u o t a  under  t h e  ( a  + 6)-method,  whereas  a l l  o f  them do s o  under  
$7 .  - S i n c e  any p a r t y  c e r t a i n l y  h a s  a  v e r y  s t r o n g  c l a i m  i n  e q u i t y  
t o  b e  a l l o c a t e d  a t  l e a s t  i t s  lower  q u o t a ,  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method 
seems t o  be  t h e  s u p e r i o r  one o f  t h e  two. I n  f a c t ,  we have t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t .  
( 3 )  ?he e ie j ' f erson  method i s  t h e  o n l y  d i v i s o r  method t h a t  
s a t i s l i e s  l o w e r  q u o t a  and encourzages  c o a Z i t i o n s .  
T h i s  i s  a  consequence  o f  more g e n e r a l  r e s u l t s  p roved  i n  
[ 3 , 6 1 .  
Viewed i n  t h i s  l i g h t  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method p r e s e n t s  s t r o n g  
c r e d e n t i a l s  f o r  b e i n g  a d o p t e d  i n  a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
s y s t e m .  Sainte-Lagfle  a p p e a r s  t o  have r e a l i z e d  t h e  t endency  o f  
J t o  e n c o u r a g e  c o a l i t i o n s ,  b u t  he  gave  no p r o o f s  and  h i s  s t a t e -  
ment h a s  t h e  c u r i o s i t y  o f  r e f e r r i n g  t o  a  compar i son :  " I n  compar- 
i n g  t h e  two r u l e s ,  one  can show t h a t  t h e  d l H o n d t  r u l e  ( J )  f a v o r s  
t h e  g r o u p i n g  of  p a r t i e s  which ,  by c o a l e s c i n g ,  may r e c e i v e  more 
s e a t s ;  whereas  t h e  method o f  l e a s t  s q u a r e s  ( W )  - f a v o r s  n e i t h e r  
g r o u p i n g s  n o r  s c h i s m s "  [ 2 0 ,  p .3781.  A u n i q u e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  
o f  W may, however,  be g i v e n  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  " r o u n d i n g "  p r o p e r t i e s  
- 
( s e e  [ 2 1 ) .  
The method o f  s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s  i s ,  i n  a  c e r t a i n  s e n s e ,  
" symmet r ic"  w i t h  J. - Thus we have  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t  (which 
i s  a l s o  a  consequence o f  theorems  i n  [ 3 , 6 1  . ) . 
( 4 )  The me thod  o f  s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s  i s  t h e  o n l y  divisor 
method  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  u p p e r  q u o t a  and  e n c o u r a g e s  s c h i s m s .  
UNIFORM EETHODS 
A "method" o f  a l l o c a t i o n  b r i n g s  t o  mind t h e  d i c t i o n a r y  
d e f i n i t i o n :  a  s y s t e m a t i c  means o r  manner o f  p r o c e d u r e .  I t  con- 
veys  a  s e n s e  o f  r e g u l a r i t y .  What i s  a  v a l i d  m a t h e m a t i c a l  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  meaning? Here we i n t r o d u c e  and e x p l a i n  a  n o t i o n  
which c a p t u r e s  t h i s  s e n s e .  
C o n s i d e r  a  two-par ty  problem i n  which e a c h  p a r t y  h a s  p r e -  
c i s e l y  t h e  same number o f  v o t e s  and t h e r e  i s  an even  number o f  
s e a t s  t o  a l l o c a t e .  We s a y  t h a t  a  method i s  b a l a n c e d  i f  i t  h a s  
an a l l o c a t i o n  g i v i n g  t h e  same number o f  s e a t s  t o  e a c h  p a r t y .  
(An e q u i v a l e n t  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  g i v e n  i n  [ 3 ] . )  It i s  an o b v i o u s  
t r u i s m  t h a t  e v e r y  method e v e r  p roposed  o r  c o n s i d e r e d  i s  b a l a n c e d .  
I n  t h e  s e q u e l  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  o n l y  b a l a n c e d  methods--except  t o  
p o i n t  t o  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  "unba lanced"  o n e s - -  and s o  w i l l  d r o p  
any f u r t h e r  ( r e d u n d a n t )  ment ion  o f  t h i s  p r o p e r t y .  
D i v i s o r  methods (which a r e  o f  c o u r s e  b a l a n c e d )  a r e  house  
monotone. But t h e y  a l s o  have  a n o t h e r  p r o p e r t y - - " u n i f o r m i t y u  
--which i s  a l o g i c a l  t r a n s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  i n t u i t i v e  n o t i o n  o f  
"method".  C o n s i d e r  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  problem o f  T a b l e  2 ,  and sup-  
p o s e ,  f o r  example ,  t h a t  t h e  problem i s  m o d i f i e d  a s  f o l l o w s :  
p a r t i e s  E and F  a r e  d i s q u a l i f i e d ,  s o  t h e  t o t a l  v o t e  i s  8 7 , 4 8 3  
and  t h e r e  a r e  32 s e a t s  amongst  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  s t a t e s .  I f  t h e  
W e b s t e r  method W were  now u s e d  t o  a l l o c a t e  a  h o u s e  o f  3 2  
s e a t s  t o  p a r t i e s  A ,  B ,  C, and D ,  t h e n  one  would n a t u r a l l y  
e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  would  b e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same a s  
t h o s e  i n  T a b l e  2 ,  name ly ,  1 0 ,  9 ,  8 ,  a n d  5 ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h a t  
i s ,  d r o p p i n g  c e r t a i n  p a r t i e s  and  t h e  s e a t s  a l l o c a t e d  t o  them 
s h o u l d  n o t  c h a n g e  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s e a t s  among t h e  p a r t i e s  
t h a t  r e m a i n .  The s o l u t i o n  m i g h t  b e  s a i d  t o  b e  " s e c e s s i o n - p r o o f " .  
One a c t u a l l y  would e x p e c t  more o f  a  "method":  w h e n e v e r  f o u r  
p a r t i e s  h a v i n g  t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  o f  A ,  B ,  C ,  and D a r e  t o  s h a r e  
32 s e a t s  among them,  t h e n  t h e s e  s e a t s  s h o u l d  a l w a y s  b e  s h a r e d  
i n  t h e  same way ( e x c e p t  a l l o w i n g  f o r  t i e s ) .  T h i s  e x p e c t a t i o n  
o f  " u n i f o r m i t y "  i s  f u l f i l l e d  by  t h e  W e b s t e r  me thod ,  a l l  d i v i s o r  
me thods  a n d ,  i n  f a c t ,  by a  v a s t l y  l a r q e r  c l a s s  o f  me thods .  
To be  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  p r e c i s e ,  c o n s i d e r  a n  a r b i t r a r y  method 
M and  two d i f f e r e n t  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  v o t e  t o t a l s  ( p , q )  and  ( p , q l )  , 
- - - 
e a c h  p rob lem c o n t a i n i n g  a  se t  o f  p a r t i e s  w i t h  i d e n t i c a l  v o t e  
t o t a l s  p .  Suppose  t h a t  ( a , b )  i s  an  M - a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  ( p , q )  , t h a t  
- - - - 
( a ' , b l )  i s  a n  M - a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  ( p , q l ) ,  and  1 a i  = 1 a;. Then M 
- - - 
i s  uniform i f  ( a '  ,b) i s  a l s o  a n  M - a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  ( p , q ) ,  and ( a , b ' )  
- - - ." - 
a l s o  a n  M - a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  (p,ql  ) . 
- 
Not a l l  me thods  a r e  u n i f o r m :  t h e  Hami l ton  method i s  n o t .  
F o r ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  example  o f  T a b l e  3. The  H a m i l t o n  method 
u n i q u e l y  d i v i d e s  10 s e a t s  among D, E ,  and F by t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
( 5 , 4 , 1 )  i n  one  i n s t a n c e  (when t h e  t o t a l  h o u s e  i s  36)  , w h e r e a s  
it u n i q u e l y  a l l o c a t e s  them ( 6 , 3 , 1 )  i n  a n o t h e r  i n s t a n c e  (when t h e  
t o t a l  h o u s e  is 3 9 ) .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  d i v i s o r  methods  a r e  
u n i f o r m  (see ( 6 )  be low)  s i n c e  t h e y  p r o c e e d  by compar ing  t h e  
p r i o r i t i e s  o f  p a r t i e s  p a i r  by p a i r  t h r o u g h  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  p / d ( a ) ,  
s o  t h e  o r d e r  i n  a s s i g n i n g  s e a t s  t o  a  s u b s e t  o f  p a r t i e s  n e e d  n o t  
c h a n g e  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  o t h e r  p a r t i e s .  T h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  i m -  
m e d i a t e l y  s u g g e s t s  a  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n .  
L e t  r ( p , a )  b e  any  r e a l - v a l u e d  f u n c t i o n  o f  two r e a l  v a r i a b l e s  
c a l l e d  a  r a v k  in ye^ ( p o s s i b l y  i n c l u d i n g  ' f o r  c e r t a i n  v a l u e s  
o f  p a  and a ) .  G iven  a  r a n k  i n d e x ,  a  ( q e n e r a l i z e d )  l ) ~ t i ? ~ ( ~ t  J ? )  
m e t h o d  [ 3 ]  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  M i s  t h e  se t  o f  a l l  s o l u t i o n s  f  o b t a i n e d  
- - 
r e c u r s i v e l y  a s  f o l l o w s :  
( i i )  I f  a i  = f .  1( p , h )  -. i s  a n  M - a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h ,  a n d  k i s  
some o n e  p a r t y  f o r  wh ich  
r ( p k , a k )  2 r ( p i a i )  f o r  1 5  i 2 s 
t h e n  
f k ( p , h +  1) = a k +  1 , f .  ( p , h +  1) = a i  f o r  i # k .  
- 1 - 
S i n c e  we c o n s i d e r  o n l y  b a l a n c e d  m e t h o d s ,  we must  have  r ( p ,  a  - 1) 2 
r ( p , a )  f o r  a l l  p  a n d  a ,  b e c a u s e  o t h e r w i s e  an  a l l o c a t i o n  t o  t h e  
t w o - p a r t y  p rob lem ( p , p )  o f  fo rm ( a - l , a + l )  would  r e s u l t .  Hun t ing -  
t o n  me thods  a r e  a  d i r e c t  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  d i v i s o r  me thods  a n d  
a r e  h o u s e  monotone and  u n i f o r m  f o r  t h e  same r e a s o n s .  They ad -  
m i t  a  l o c a l  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  o f  a l l o c a t i o n s .  
( 5 )  a  i s  a n  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  t h e  H u n t i n g t o n  m e t h o d  M b a s e d  
- - 
o n  r ( p , a )  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  ( w i t h  r ( p , - 1 )  = a) 
max. r ( p i , a i )  ' m i n i  r ( p i , a i - 1 )  - 
1 - 
T h i s  i s  i m m e d i a t e  by d e f i n i t i o n .  I t  a p p l i e s  t o  d i v i s o r  me thods ;  
t h u s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  a  i s  a  J e f f e r s o n  a l l o c a t i o n  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  
- 
One a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  i s  t o  show t h a t  v a r i o u s  
me thods  t h a t  g o  by d i f f e r e n t  names and  d e s c r i p t i o n s  i n  t h e  lit- 
e r a t u r e  a r e  a c t u a l l y  t h e  same method.  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h e  method 
o f  l a  r 6 p a r t i t i o n  2 l a  p l u s  f o r t e  rnoyenne -- u s u a l l y  a s c r i b e d  t o  
d ' H o n d t  -- h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  [17]. F i r s t ,  g i v e  t o  
e z c h  s t a t e  i t s  l o w e r  q u o t a  Lpih/pJ = a i ;  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  
r e m a i n i n g  t o  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  i s  t h e n  h -  Ciai. F o r  t h e s e  r e m a i n -  
i n g  s e a t s ,  p r o c e e d  a s  f o r  J ,  ( t h a t  i s ,  a s  f o r  t h e  H u n t i n g t o n  
- 
method w i t h  r ( p ,  a )  = p/  ( a + l )  . But  t h i s  must  g i v e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same 
answer  a s  J ,  s i n c e  a s  we have n o t e d  above ( 3 ) ,  any J - s o l u t i o n  
- - 
automaticaZZy s a t i s f i e s  lower  q u o t a .  
D'Hondt a c t u a l l y  made t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o p o s a l :  "... t o  a l -  
l o c a t e  d i s c r e t e  e n t i t i e s  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y  among s e v e r a l  numbers ,  
it  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d i v i d e  t h e s e  numbers by a  common d i v i s o r ,  
p r o d u c i n g  q u o t i e n t s  whose sum i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  number o f  e n t i -  
t i e s  t o  be a l l o c a t e d "  [13 ,  p .221.  Thus,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  d l H o n d t ,  
w e  a r e  t o  f i n d  a  " d i v i s o r "  A s u c h  t h a t  t h e  i n t e g e r  p a r t s  o f  t h e  
numbers p./A sum t o  h ,  t h a t  i s ,  Ii Lpi/AJ = h .  To s e e  t h a t  t h i s  
i s  t h e  same a s  J ,  set  a .  = Lpi/AJ and n o t i c e  t h a t ,  by d e f i n i t i o n  
- 
o f  t h e  i n t e g e r  p a r t ,  
Thus 
pi/ ( a i + l )  < A pi/ai  f o r  a l l  i , 
t h a t  i s ,  
max p i / ( a i + l )  2 min pi/ai , 
1 i 
s o  by ( 5 )  ( a l , . .  . , a s )  i s  a  J a p p o r t i o n m e n t  f o r  h .  The c o n v e r s e  
- 
i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  s i m i l a r l y .  
But e x a c t l y  t h e  same i d e a  was p roposed  by Thomas J e f f e r s o n  
i n  a  l e t t e r  t o  George Washington n e a r l y  a  c e n t u r y  e a r l i e r  ( 1 7 9 2 ) :  
" f o r  representatives t h e r e  can  be n o  s u c h  common r a t i o ,  o r  d i -  
v i s o r  which ... w i l l  d i v i d e  them e x a c t l y  w i t h o u t  a  r e m a i n d e r  
o r  f r a c t i o n .  I answer  t h e n  . . .  t h a t  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  [must  be 
d i v i d e d ]  a s  nearZy a s  t h e  nearest r a t i o  w i l l  a d m i t ;  and t h e  
f r a c t i o n s  must be  n e g l e c t e d "  [ l l ,  p .  4631. For  t h i s  r e a s o n  t h e  
d i v i s o r  method J must  be  c r e d i t e d  t o  J e f f e r s o n .  
... 
T h a t  H u n t i n g t o n  methods c o n s t i t u t e  a  v e r y  g e n e r a l  c l a s s  
may be s e e n  from t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t  (which f o l l o w s  from ( 7 )  
below and t h e  main theorem o f  [ 4 ] )  . 
( 6 )  A ( b a l a n c e d )  M i s  house  monotone and u n i f o r m  i f  and 
- 
o n l y  i f  it i s  a  H u n t i n g t o n  method based  on c rank  i n d e x  
r ( p , a )  w h i c h  i s  n o n i n c r e a s i n g  i n  a .  
House m o n o t o n i c i t y  and u n i f o r m i t y  a r e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  imply t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  of  a  r ank  i n d e x  r ( p , a ) .  T h i s  i s  a  s t r o n g  i m p l i c a t i o n .  
I t  p e r m i t s  a  h o s t  o f  p e r t i n e n t  c o n c l u s i o n s .  I t  s h o u l d  be  n o t e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  r a t h e r  dub ious  non-balanced Hunt ing ton  
methods c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by rank  i n d i c e s  such  a s  r ( p , a )  = a / p :  
t h i s  method g i v e s  a l l  s e a t s  t o  t h e  p a r t y  which r e c e i v e s  t h e  
f i r s t  s e a t .  
The s t a t e m e n t  ( 6 )  p e r m i t s  a  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  some o f  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  r e s u l t s .  Thus ( 3 )  c a n  be  s t a t e d :  t h e r e  i s  e x a c t l y  
one u n i f o r m ,  house monotone method s a t i s f y i n g  lower  q u o t a  and  
e n c o u r a g i n g  c o a l i t i o n s ,  namely,  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method. And ( 4 )  
c a n  b e  r e f o r m u l a t e d :  t h e r e  i s  e x a c t l y  one u n i f o r m ,  house  mono- 
t o n e  method s a t i s f y i n g  upper  q u o t a  and e n c o u r a g i n g  s c h i s m s ,  
namely,  t h e  method o f  s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s .  
There  i s  a n o t h e r  way of v iewing  u n i f o r m i t y .  C o n s i d e r  an 
a r b i t r a r y  house  monotone method M. - The b e h a v i o r  of  M - can  b e  
s p e c i f i e d  s i m p l y  by s a y i n g  how one g e t s  an a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  a  
house  w i t h  h +  1 s e a t s ,  g i v e n  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  a  house  w i t h  
h  s e a t s ;  t h a t  i s ,  a l l  t h a t  i s  needed t o  b e  known i s  which 
s t a t e  h a s  p r i o r i t y  i n  r e c e i v i n g  t h e  n e x t  s e a t .  An a r b i t r a r y  
method M i s  c o n s i s t e n t  i f  t h e  d e c i s i o n  a s  t o  which p a r t y  o f  any 
p a i r  most d e s e r v e s  t h e  e x t r a  s e a t  when t h e  house  s i z e  i s  i n -  
c r e a s e d  by 1, depends upon o n l y  t h e  v o t e  t o t a l s  and t h e  s e a t s  
a l r e a d y  a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h o s e  p a r t i e s  s i n g l y ,  and  n o t  on any o t h e r  
d a t a  ( s u c h  a s  t h e  house s i z e ,  number o f  o t h e r  p a r t i e s ,  o r  v o t e  
t o t a l s  o f  o t h e r  p a r t i e s ) .  The example of  T a b l e  3  shows t h a t  
t h e  Hamil ton method i s  n o t  c o n s i s t e n t .  P a r t i e s  D and E r e c e i v e  
5  and 3  s e a t s ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  f o r  h  = 35 and h  = 38, b u t  u n i q u e l y  
r e c e i v e  5 and 4 f o r  h  = 36 and u n i q u e l y  6  and 3  f o r  h  = 39. How- 
e v e r ,  it i s  immedia te ly  c l e a r  t h a t  a l l  Hunt ing ton  methods a r e  
c o n s i s t e n t .  Indeed ,  c o n s i s t e n c y  and u n i f o r m i t y  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  
t h e  same: 
( 7 )  A ( b a l a n c e d )  h o u s e  m o n o t o n e  m e t h o d  M i s  u n i f o r m  i f  and 
- 
o n l y  i f  i t  i s  c o n s i s t e n t .  
F o r  t h e  p r o o f  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  s e e  t h e  Append ix .  
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
( 8 )  T h e r e  i s  no  u n i f o r m ,  h o u s e  m o n o t o n e  m e t h o d  w h i c h  s a t i s f i e s  
q u o t a .  
I f  a  method i s  h o u s e  monotone  a n d  u n i f o r m  t h e n  it i s  a  H u n t i n g t o n  
method (see A p p e n d i x ) .  B u t  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  method i s  t h e  o n l y  
H u n t i n g t o n  method t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  l o w e r  q u o t a  and t h e  method o f  
s m a l l e s t  d i v i s o r s  i s  t h e  o n l y  method t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  u p p e r  q u o t a  
[ 6 , 7 ] .  S i n c e  t h e s e  me thods  a r e  d i f f e r e n t ,  t h e r e  c a n  b e  no u n i -  
form,  h o u s e  monotone  method s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a .  
QUOTATONE METHODS 
T h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s  a p p e a r  t o  d o m i n a t e  i n  i m p o r t a n c e - - h o u s e  
m o n o t o n i c i t y ,  u n i f o r m i t y ,  and  s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a - -  b u t  t h e y  c a n n o t  
b e  s a t i s f i e d  by any  o n e  me thod .  T h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  q u e s t i o n :  i s  
t h e r e  some "min ima l"  weaken ing  o f  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  wh ich  a d m i t s  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  method? 
The n e e d  f o r  h o u s e  m o n o t o n i c i t y  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  demon-- 
s t r a t e d .  A l l o c a t i o n s  wh ich  d o  n o t  s a t i s f y  q u o t a - - t h a t  i s ,  
which  a r e  n o t  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  r o u n d i n g  t h e  e x a c t  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
s h a r e  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  due  t o  a  p a r t y  e i t h e r  up  and d o w n - - s e e m  
t o  v i o l a t e  common s e n s e  and h a v e  p r o v e n  t o  b e  p o l i t i c a l l y  sub- 
ject  t o  a t t a c k  (see,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  [ 1 9 , 2 4 ]  . A  p a r t y  r e c e i v i n g  
40 s e a t s  when i t s  p r o p o r t i o n a l  s h a r e  i s  37 .34  seems u n r e a s o n a b l y  
w e l l  s e r v e d ;  i f  i t s  t r u e  s h a r e  w e r e  i n s t e a d  43.34 i t s  l e a d e r s h i p  
would  j u s t i f i a b l y  c o m p l a i n .  S a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a  seems e s s e n t i a l .  
No te  t h a t  any  method s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a  i s  a l m o s t  s t a b l e  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  t h a t  i f  any  two p a r t i e s  w i t h  a *  a n d  a c o a l e s c e ,  t h e n  t h e  
c o a l e s c e d  p a r t y  r e c e i v e s  b  s e a t s  where  a * +  a -  2  5 - b  5 - a *  + a +  2.  
Given  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  it i s  r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  
weaken t h e  u n i f o r m i t y  o r  c o n s i s t e n c y  c o n d i t i o n .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  
we s a y  t h a t  a  method 2 i s  q u o t a  c o n s i s t e n t  i f  it i s  c o n s i s t e n t  
s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  n e e d  t o  s a t i s f y  u p p e r  q u o t a ,  t h a t  i s ,  c o n s i s t e n t  
u n l e s s  t h i s  i m p e r a t i v e  is  i n  c o n f l i c t  w i t h  s a t i s f y i n g  u p p e r  
q u o t a ,  i n  w h i c h  c a s e  i t  c e d e s  t o  t h e  l a t t e r  s t r o n g e r  i m p e r a t i v e .  
Then,  it c a n  b e  a f f i r m e d  ( [ 1 , 7 ] ) .  
( 9 )  T h e r e  e x i s t s  a  u n i q u e  a l l o c a t i o n  method Q ,  t h e  q u o t a  
- 
m e t h o d ,  t h a t  i s  h o u s e  mono t o n e ,  q u o t a  c o n s i s  t e n t ,  and 
s a t i s f i e s  q u o t a .  
The q u o t a  method Q i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  J e f f e r s o n  me thod ,  a n d  
- 
may b e  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l o c a t i o n s  computed r e c u r s i v e l y  
a s  f o l l o w s :  
( i i)  L e t  a i  = f i ( e , h )  b e  an  a l l o c a t i o n  f o r  h  a n d  l e t  E ( h + l )  
b e  t h e  se t  o f  p a r t i e s  wh ich  c a n  b e  g i v e n  an  e x t r a  s e a t  
w i t h o u t  v i o l a t i n g  u p p e r  q u o t a  a t  h o u s e  s i z e  h  + 1. I f  
k c E ( h + l )  i s  some o n e  p a r t y  f o r  wh ich  
pk ( a k  + 1) , - p i / ( a i  + 1) f o r  a l l  i E E ( h + l )  
t h e n  
S t a t e m e n t  ( 9 )  g i v e s  p o w e r f u l  r e a s o n s  f o r  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  
q u o t a  method Q i n  p r o b l e m s  o f  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  I n  
- 
p r a c t i c e  o n e  f i n d s  t h a t  Q h a s  a  t e n d e n c y  t o  p r o d u c e  s o l u t i o n s  
- 
t h a t  r o u n d  u p  t h e  e x a c t  q u o t a s  o f  l a r g e  p a r t i e s  more o f t e n  t h a n  
t h o s e  o f  s m a l l  p a r t i e s .  T h i s  seems r e a s o n a b l e  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a -  
t i o n  o f  Q t o  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  s y s t e m s  i n  t h a t  it i n -  
- 
f e r e n t i a l l y  a s k s  f o r  a  " l a r g e "  v o t e  b e f o r e  a c c o r d i n g  a n y  r e p r e -  
s e n t a t i o n  a t  a l l .  N o t i c e ,  however ,  t h a t  n o  l a r g e  p a r t y  i s  a l -  
lowed more s e a t s  t h a n  i t s  u p p e r  q u o t a .  
One c a n  s imply  d r o p  t h e  u n i f o r m i t y  o r  c o n s i s t e n c y  c o n d i t i o n  
and a s k  a b o u t  t h e  c l a s s  o f  a22  methods t h a t  a r e  house  monotone 
and s a t i s f y  q u o t a .  These a r e  c a l l e d  q u o t a t o n e  m e t h o d s .  They 
a r e  d e s c r i b a b l e  and have been c h a r a c t e r i z e d  i n  s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  
ways [ 5 , 2 2 1 .  There  a r e  a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  methods 
which a r e  q u o t a t o n e  and a l l  o p e r a t e  a s  f o l l o w s .  I n  a  house h =  0 
a l l  p a r t i e s  have no r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  Given a n  a l l o c a t i o n  - f ( p , h ) =  - 
a  f o r  h ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  s p e c i f i e s  a  set  o f  p a r t i e s  which 
- 
a r e  " e l i g i b l e "  t o  r e c e i v e  an e x t r a  s e a t ,  e l i g i b l e  meaning t h a t  
t h i s  c a n  be done i n  a  manner which w i l l  g u a r a n t e e  q u o t a  and 
house  m o n o t o n i c i t y .  Some c h o i c e  mechanism ( e . g . ,  a  r ank  i n d e x )  
c a n  b e  imposed t o  d e t e r m i n e  which p a r t y  r e c e i v e s  t h e  s e a t  a t  
h  + 1 i f  t h e r e  i s  more t h a n  one  e l i g i b l e  p a r t y .  The d i f f i c u l t y  
i s  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  e l i g i b l e  p a r t i e s  h a s  no r a t i o n a l  d i r e c t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o t h e r  t h a n  t h a t  j u s t  g i v e n ,  and  t h a t  i t s  compu- 
t a t i o n  i s  c o n c e p t u a l l y  complex ( a l t h o u g h  e a s i l y  accompl i shed  by 
compute r )  . 
I n  t h e  c l a s s  o f  q u o t a t o n e  methods t h e  q u o t a  method Q e n j o y s  
- 
a n  e s p e c i a l l y  n a t u r a l  p o s i t i o n  [ 5 ] ;  moreover ,  i t s  e l i g i b i l i t y  
s e t  i s  e a s i l y  u n d e r s t o o d  and computed s i n c e  it s imply  a s k s  t h a t  
t h e  upper  q u o t a  C o n d i t i o n  n o t  be  v i o l a t e d .  I t  i s  t h e  un ique  
method which d e v o l v e s  from a  minimal  weakening o f  t h e  c o n s i s t e n -  
c y  c o n d i t i o n .  
CONCLUSIONS 
T h i s  p a p e r  h a s  a d d r e s s e d  t h e  problem o f  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
i n t e g r a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  t o  p a r t i e s  h a v i n g  v o t e  t o t a l s  i n  a  pro-  
p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  sys tem.  The p r i n c i p a l  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  
methods o f  a l l o c a t i o n  s h o u l d  n o t  be  chosen  by b i c k e r i n g  o v e r  
numbers ,  n o r ,  i n d e e d ,  t h r o u g h  ad  h o c  c l a i m s  o f  v a r i o u s  mechan- 
i c a l  p r o c e d u r e s ,  b u t  r a t h e r  t h r o u g h  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  
methods.  The i s s u e  i s  t o  d e c i d e  upon a  method whose q u a l i t a t i v e  
p r o p e r t i e s  a r e  e q u i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a t  hand.  T h i s  a n a l y s i s  
commends one of  two methods: t h e  q u o t a  method Q ,  o r  t h e  J e f f e r s ~ n  
- 
method J .  
- 
The J e f f e r s o n  method c l a i m s  r e c o g n i t i o n  b e c a u s e  it i s  
h o u s e  monotone,  u n i f o r m ,  g u a r a n t e e s  l o w e r  q u o t a ,  and e n c o u r a g e s  
c o a l i t i o n s .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  e n c o u r a g i n g  c o a l i t i o n s  would  seem t o  
be p r e c i s e l y  t h e  t y p e  o f  s t a b i l i t y  d e s i r e d  f o r  a  body p o l i t i c  
o p e r a t i n g  a  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  s y s t e m .  However, a  
m a j o r  d e f e c t  o f  2 i s  t h a t  it f a i l s  t h e  s e e m i n g l y  most  common- 
s e n s e  t e s t  o f  s a t i s f y i n g  q u o t a .  The Quota  method m e r i t s  r e c o g -  
n i t i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  d o e s  s a t i s f y  q u o t a ,  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  s u b j e c t  t o  
t h a t  p r o p e r t y ,  a n d  is h o u s e  monotone.  I t  i s  " a l m o s t  stah1.e" 
( s e e  [ 3 1 ) ,  b u t  d o e s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  e n c o u r a g e  c o a l i t i o n s .  
The c h o i c e  be tween  t h e s e  methods  o f  a l l o c a t i o n  s h o u l d  be  
made i n  t e r m s  o f  wh ich  c r i t e r i a  a r e  v iewed a s  mos t  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  
t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n .  
We f i r s t  p rove  t h a t  t h e  Hamil ton method i s  s t a b l e  ( s e e  ( 2 ) )  
C o n s i d e r  any two p a r t i e s ,  s a y  i = 1 , 2 ,  and suppose  
t h a t  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  problem p a r t y  i h a s  an e x a c t  q u o t a  
qi  = n .  + ri , n .  > 0  and i n t e g e r ,  and 0  ( r .  < 1, and l e t  a .  be  
1 - 1 
t h e i r  a l l o c a t i o n s  a t  h .  Then f o r  t h e  problem i n  which p a r t i e s  
1 and 2  form a  c o a l i t i o n ,  i t s  e x a c t  q u o t a  f o r  h  i s  q l  + q 2  = 
n1 + n  + r1 + r2 .  L e t  b  be  t h e  number o f  s e a t s  g i v e n  t h e  c o a l i -  
t i o n  by t h e  Hamil ton method. 
We c o n s i d e r  s e v e r a l  c a s e s .  F i r s t ,  i f  b  = n  + n2 t h e n  
r + r < 1, i m p l y i n g  t h a t  t h e  same t o t a l  number o f  p a r t i e s  i s  2  
rounded up i n  b o t h  problems.  I f  r l  , r2 > 0  t h e n  it must be 
t h a t  a .  = n .  (i  = 1 , 2 ) .  For  o t h e r w i s e  one o f  t h e  two p a r t i e s  
would have  a  remainder  ri h i g h  enough i n  t h e  l i s t  t o  w a r r a n t  an 
e x t r a  s e a t  w h i l e  r 1 + '2 > r l ,  r 2  i s  n o t  h i g h  enough ,  which can- 
n o t  be .  I f  r l  = O t h e n  a l =  n l a n d  a 2  = n2 o r  a 2  = n2 + 1 ;  i n  
e i t h e r  c a s e  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  
I f  b  = n l  + n 2  + 1, t h e n  s i n c e  a .  = ni o r  n .  + 1 t h e r e  i s  
n o t h i n g  more t o  show. I f  b  = n l  + n2 + 2 ,  t h e n  r l  + r 2  > 1. 
Suppose s t a b i l i t y  i s  n o t  s a t i s f i e d ,  i - e . ,  t h a t  a .  = n .  ( i  = 1 , 2 ) .  1 
Then f o r  some p a r t y  k  # 1 , 2 ,  r l  + r 2  - 1 2 - rk  w h i l e  r l  ( rk  and 
r < r Thus 2 r k  - 1 2 rk and rk  2 1, a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  2  = k -  - 
N e x t ,  we show t h a t  a  b a l a n c e d  house  monotone method M i s  
- 
u n i f o r m  i f  and  o n l y  i f  it i s  c o n s i s t e n t  ( s e e  ( 7 ) ) .  
F i r s t ,  assume t h a t  M i s  house monotone and c o n s i s t e n t .  
The main theorem o f  [ 4 ]  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h i s  i m p l i e s  M i s  a  Hunt ing-  
t o n  method b a s e d  on some rank  i n d e x  r ( p , a ) .  I f ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  
M i s  b a l a n c e d  t h e n  r ( p , a - 1 )  2 r ( p , a )  and 2 i s  a n  M-apportion- 
- - 
ment i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e  min-max i n e q u a l i t y  o f  ( 5 )  i s  s a t i s f i e d .  
To p r o v e  u n i f o r m i t y  suppose  t h a t  ( a ,  b )  is  a n  !-apportionment f o r  
- - 
( p , ? )  and t h a t  ( a t , b ' )  - - i s  one f o r  ( p , c j t )  - where l . a .  = Cia;, a  # a t .  
1 1  - 
Then, by ( 5 1 ,  
max {r(pi,ai) ,r(q.,b.) 1 2 min {r(pi,ai-1) ,r(q. ,b.-1)) , 
i,j 1 i,j 1 1 
(10) and 
max {r(pi,ab),r(q!,b!)j 2 min ir(pi,aj-l),r(q!,b!-1)) . 
ill I i,j 1 I 
~t must be shown that (al,b) is an M-apportionment for ( p , q )  
- - 
and (arbt) is an M-apportionment for ( p , ? ' ) .  Since lai = lab, 
- - - 
a a' implies that there exist parties k and with ak 2 ai+l 
- - 
and at ( ai-1. Therefore 
the first and third inequalities following from (lo), the second 
and fourth following from r(p,a) being nonincreasing in a.. 
Thus every inequality is an equation and the max-min inequali- 
ties (10) must both be satisfied as equations having a common 
value, say A .  Therefore, 
max {r(pi,a;) ,r(qj,bj)} = X = min { r (pi ,a;-1) ,r (q b .-I) 1 
irj i,j jf I 
and 
max {r(p.,a.),r(q.,b!)l = X = min {r(pi,ai-1) ,r(q. b.-1)) 
1 1  I i,j i, j I, I 
which establishes, by the test ( 5 ) ,  the desired result. 
Second, assume that M is house monotone and uniform.  e ere 
. 
it is not necessary to assume that M is balanced.) Consider 
two problems, (pl,p2,q) and (pllp2,q'), and suppose that the 
first has an M-apportionment (al,a2,b) and the second (al,a2,b'), 
-. - 
that the first has ac the next house the apportionment 
(al+l,a2 ,b )  whereas the second has at the next house (al,a2+l,bt) ,
a seeming "switch" in priorities. Then, by uniformity, the 
first also has an apportionment (al,a2+l,b) and the second also 
has (al+l,a2,b), thus showing that there is a "tie" in priorities 
and that M is consistent. 
- 
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